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Abstract: With the nationalist government – Kuomintang (KMT) – 
retreating from mainland China in 1949, some 600,000 military per-
sonnel relocated to Taiwan. The military seized former Japanese co-
lonial properties and built its own settlements, establishing temporary 
military dependents’ villages called juancun (䛟㛹). When the prospect 
of counter-attacking the mainland vanished, the KMT had to face the 
reality of settling permanently in Taiwan. How, then, did the KMT’s 
authoritarian power enter the everyday lives of its own support 
group? In this article I will focus on the coercive elements of KMT 
authoritarianism, which permeated these military villages in Taiwan. I 
will look at the coercive mechanisms through the analytical lens of 
Foucauldian discipline. I argue that disciplinary techniques such as 
surveillance, disciplining of the body and the senses, as well as the 
creation of morality regimes played an important role in the co-opta-
tion of village residents into KMT authoritarianism by normalising 
and naturalising it. 
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$XWKRULWDULDQLVPLQWKH/LYLQJ5RRP
I met Mr. He in the afternoon of a warm September day in the secur-
ity room of a Taiwan Metro station in Taibei city. Being the son of a 
mainlander couple who retreated from mainland China to Taiwan in 
1949, he can be considered a second-generation mainlander (ཆⴱӪ
ㅜҼԓ , waishengren dierdai). In 1949 the nationalist government – 
Kuomintang (KMT, Guomindang, GMD) – retreated to Taiwan, 
which saw the arrival of two million mainlanders (⢾䚩Ṣ, waisheng-
ren) of whom it has been estimated that 600,000 were military per-
sonnel. A political crisis ensued, one that saw the KMT occupy Tai-
wan by force and which also caused a refugee and housing crisis too – 
with the mainlanders arriving in Taiwan’s cities en masse. I asked Mr. 
He to tell me about his own experience of dwelling in military de-
pendents’ villages during KMT authoritarianism. He explained:  
The military village where I lived in Jingmei was under the control 
of the Ministry of Defence. My father was originally a member of 
the party (唘଑, dangyuan), but he sanguinely withdrew from it after 
a while for reasons that are not completely clear to me. In our vil-
lage there were military personnel who went missing (ཡ䑚, shi-
zong), and nobody knew anything about why. These people went 
to work, finished work, but they never went back to the village. 
Vanished. Their families were still there and they still received a 
salary from the head of the family, but we would not know where 
the person ended up […]. Our village was really small, around 30 
households, and yet, about seven military personnel went missing. 
In such a small village, we saw how many people disappeared! The 
proportion is very high, you know! (Mr. He 2016) 
This article focuses, then, on how authoritarian power permeates the 
level of people’s daily life through everyday practices. It aims first at 
understanding the ways in which KMT authoritarianism was diffused 
on a micro level within its own support group – that is, its military 
personnel – and the people who were expected to remain loyal to the 
KMT, namely their families. I therefore particularly consider the resi-
dents of the so-called military dependents’ villages (ⵧᶁ, juancun), 
settlements created to house military personnel and their families 
after the retreat of the nationalist government to Taiwan in 1949. 
How did KMT authoritarianism enter the everyday lives of juancun 
residents?  
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To shed light on how authoritarianism was operated, legitimised, 
and sustained, it is necessary to inquire how this power permeated the 
everyday lives of the people who were meant to secure the island of 
Taiwan along with the KMT government. How was this loyalty en-
sured? How did KMT authoritarianism co-opt the military villages in 
its struggle for legitimisation? I argue that it was both mechanisms of 
coercion and consent that allowed the KMT regime to secure the 
loyalty of this group.  
The academic literature on authoritarianism in Taiwan has fo-
cused on the institutional transformation of the KMT party-state 
(Chu and Lin 2001; Cheng 2006; Wang 2015), or on the victims of 
well-researched tragic events such as the 2.28 incident or the 
Kaohsiung (儈䳴, Gaoxiong) incident (Kerr 1966; Lin 2004; Chen 
2008). There has been, however, little research so far on how KMT 
authoritarianism entered the life of its own most loyal group. This is 
due to the fact that the people who fled to Taiwan after 1949 – the 
so-called waishengren – are often unquestionably and automatically 
associated with being the perpetrators of KMT authoritarianism 
(Yang and Chang 2010). While the existence of such co-optation is 
not a mystery (Wang 1994; Fell 2005), this view is often taken for 
granted. It would, however, be a mistake to take this co-optation into 
Chiang Kai-shek’s (㪻ӻ⸣, Jiang Jieshi) regime to be straightforward, 
unquestionable, or without resistance.  
Instead, we should look into the mechanisms that produced such 
loyalty. According to Gramsci (1971), hegemony has a dimension of 
coercion and consent to it. While this co-optation has been investi-
gated solely through the lens of consent, which has been analysed via 
the concept of “exchange” (Ӕᨋ , jiaohuan) (Chang 2015: 95), the 
dimension of coercion within the KMT support group has been hith-
erto overlooked. Hence, in this article I ask: How did coercion enter 
the intimate space of the village and its everyday life? How was villag-
ers’ loyalty to the party-state articulated? Which coercive elements 
were present herein, and how did these become naturalised and nor-
malised? 
While welfare measures – such as housing and United States aid  
(㖾ᨤ, meiyuan) – together with the propagandistic ideology of taking 
back the mainland worked effectively to produce consent among the 
group of the mainlanders, I argue that it was through coercive mech-
anisms that dissenting voices were individualised, disciplined, or si-
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lenced. Coercion was implemented by subtler techniques of disciplin-
ing of the body and the senses on the one hand, and the creation of 
morality regimes on the other. I conceptualise “discipline” within a 
Foucauldian framework. Foucault describes discipline as “a ‘physics’ 
or an ‘anatomy’ of power, a technology” (Foucault 1995: 215). In his 
work, focusing on everyday life is paramount: Foucault wrote that 
discipline corresponds to  
the penetration of regulation into even the smallest details of every-
day life through the mediation of the complete hierarchy that as-
sured the capillary functioning of power. (Foucault 1995: 198)  
Focusing specifically on juancun, where military personnel and their 
family lived, further allows me to look at the overlaps between state 
power and family life – of which the living room is an emblematic 
representation. The juancun living room represents the intimate sphere 
of family life, but also displays the symbols of the officialdom of the 
party-state – such as the iconic portrait of Chiang Kai-shek hung on 
its walls. 
Yet, an examination of KMT authoritarianism from the point of 
view of the same lower-ranking KMT soldiers is relevant for other 
pressing reasons too. As Wu Nai-teh notes, a true politics of recon-
ciliation in Taiwan is ineffective if it fails to recognise those “frag-
ments of shared history” (Wu 2005: 100) that transcend ethnic divi-
sion. This line of thought acknowledges that the members of both 
the so-called groups of the benshengren (ᵜⴱӪ) – Han and Hakka 
from mainland China who migrated to Taiwan before 1945 – and the 
waishengren “suffered from the abuses of human rights under authori-
tarian rule” (Wu 2005: 20). As a matter of fact, mainlanders were also 
victims of the KMT’s pervasive surveillance and repression. This was 
particularly true in the 1950s, when reform of the KMT and its mili-
tary forces was fostered by Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo  
(㭓㏃഻, Jiang Jingguo) to face the “Communist threat” and the infil-
trations of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) into Taiwan (Wu 
2005: 90; Feuchtwang 2009, 2011; Shih 2011). According to Wu:  
Of all the victims during the White Terror, Chinese mainlanders 
constituted around 40 per cent, which was much higher than their 
proportion of less than 15 per cent in the total population. (Wu 
2005: 100) 
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Through the recollections of former and current juancun residents and 
as well as my own experience of living in a military village for 18 
months, in this article I will illustrate the ways in which authoritarian 
power permeated everyday village life. I conducted extensive ethno-
graphic fieldwork in one of the last-existing juancun in Taiwan, 
Zhongxin xincun (ѝᗳᯠᶁ), located in Beitou, Taibei, before it was 
relocated to new high-rise buildings in October 2016. I complement-
ed the extensive participant observations, qualitative interviews, and 
oral history conducted in the village on its relocation with interviews 
and conversations with inhabitants and former juancun dwellers of 
different generations of formal and informal military settlements 
scattered across the whole island. Their voices are expression of the 
unwritten moral rules that bound the juancun inhabitants to the state 
within the familial and neighbourly relationships of the village. There-
fore, the focus here is not on an investigation of the structural and 
hierarchical organisation of military dependents’ villages in Taiwan, 
but rather an analysis of how power permeated and was normalised 
in their inhabitants’ everyday life. 
To this end, I will first illustrate the conditions for the emer-
gence of military villages in Taiwan. I will show what kind of threats 
the military posed to Chiang’s government in the 1950s, and the insti-
tutional measures that he consequently took to prevent internal upris-
ing. I will also explain why we should not limit conceptualising au-
thoritarianism among the mainlanders group to only consent, but 
rather see that it is necessary to look at the coercive dimension of 
authoritarianism through the Foucauldian analytical framework of 
discipline. It follows empirical material that shows how the institu-
tional measures taken by Chiang Kai-shek translated to different 
forms of everyday discipline within the military dependents’ villages, 
specifically through surveillance, the disciplining of the body and of 
the senses, as well as the creation of morality regimes. Finally, in the 
conclusion I suggest that focusing on the mainlander experience of 
KMT authoritarianism is helpful in achieving a more nuanced under-
standing of Taiwan’s authoritarianism in its initial stages – which 
might help contribute to the politics of reconciliation on the island. 
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6HFXULQJWKH,VODQG
7KH5HWUHDWRIDQGWKH&RQVWUXFWLRQRI0LOLWDU\
'HSHQGHQWV¶9LOODJHV
I don’t have any memory of my childhood until the age of five. I 
remember that when I was five years old, I used to live in a mili-
tary barrack (䓽ӪⲴѹ࣑ᡯ, junren de yiwufang). All the inhabitants 
there and their families (ⵧ኎, juanshu) were military personnel. 
There were two rows of military barracks, and each house was di-
vided into two parts. There were about 15 to 20 families living 
there. Each family divided the space with a curtain hanging from a 
thread. It was a place for the military. When the [Japanese] army 
left in 1947, the place was occupied by the mainlanders. It must 
have been 1952 when I was living in this military village, in Mu-
zha. (Mr. He 2016) 
At the age of six, Mr. He moved to the neighbourhood of Jingmei 
with his parents. His dwelling was an old warehouse (عᓛ, cangku), 
which was divided into three minuscule flats shared among three 
households (Figure 1 below). He describes his experience of dwelling 
in this former Japanese colonial estate: 
On the one side there was the Wang family, on the other the Du 
family (Figure 1). We occupied the flat in the middle. Within the 
flat there was a room with a bed on three levels. We were five 
brothers and my little sister, who slept in the same bed with my 
parents. […] The village was located on Beixing Road, behind a 
road that was called Liujun. The countryside was huge there and 
there was a big place where we could swim. The village was in the 
middle. Inside the village there was a well. It was made up of old 
Japanese buildings, all warehouses that were occupied by the 
KMT army when the Japanese left Taiwan. (Mr. He 2016) 
At first, refugees occupied public places such as squares, schools, and 
squatted on empty land – as well as residing in civilian houses, too 
(Yang 2012: 67–71). Between 1945 and 1956, KMT military person-
nel also occupied the estates left behind by the Japanese after 1945 – 
mainly military barracks, storehouses, and staples. During this phase 
of settlement, the Ministry of National Defence (MND) granted mar-
ried soldiers and married military personnel the permission to build 
their own houses on empty land that had been seized by the MND 
(Kuo 2005: 7).  
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This first phase of settlement was believed to be temporary. Taking 
back the mainland (৽᭫བྷ䲨, fangong dalu) was the KMT’s main ob-
jective, and soldiers did not expect that they would settle permanently 
in Taiwan. This is evident from the fact that in 1952, a marriage ban 
was imposed on soldiers – who were required to fight back against 
the Communists and were, for this purpose, forbidden to have a 
family life in Taiwan. The ban was eventually relaxed at the end of the 
1950s, when the MND allowed officers (䓽ᇈ, junguan), technicians  
(ᢰ㺃༛ᇈ, jishu shiguan), and students who had reached the age of 28 
to seek permission for marriage (Li 2015a: 18). Further, the Chiang 
government’s inadequate attention to the housing crisis also indicated 
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that long-term settlement was not a priority at the time (Li 2015b). 
According to Lo (2011: 192), soldiers who were not sheltered in 
juancun eventually occupied urban areas in “illegal housing” (䚅ㄐᔪㇹ, 
weizhang jianzhu) – which at the time was regarded as a cheap and 
effective way to solve the housing problem (Lo 2011: 192; Huang 
2002). It was only in 1957 that Soong Mei-ling’s (ᆻ㖾喑, Song Mei-
ling) Chinese Women’s League for Anti-Communism and Resisting 
Russia (ѝ㨟႖ྣ৽᭫ᣇ״㚟ਸᴳ, Zhonghua funü fangong kange lian-
hehui) initiated the construction of large-scale military villages by 
building the first 4,000 state-engineered ones with donations from 
private enterprises (Lo 2011: 190–191). Only married soldiers could 
reside in those villages with their families, which corresponded to 
only one-third of the military personnel in Taiwan (Li 2015a: 19). 
7KH0LOLWDU\7KUHDW
By 1956, military dependents’ villages had a precise internal organisa-
tion to them. The Women’s League was an influential institution in 
the management of military villages, as its role was not limited to 
raising funds for their construction. In large-scale ones, the Women’s 
Working Team (႖ྣᐕ֌䲺, funü gongzuodui) was in charge of main-
taining the village’s common facilities, managing nurseries and kin-
dergartens, organising vocational training for women, and supplying 
milk; they also elected their own team leader independently (Lo 2011: 
195). The team had been first established by the Women’s League in 
juancun that had been funded directly by the League, or in large-scale 
ones. It was directly subordinated to the president of the Women’s 
League, and of equal rank to the local and provincial branches of the 
League. In 1984 the team was affiliated to the branch of the Women 
League for Army Corps (䓽ൈ႖㚟࠶ᴳ, juntuan fulian fenhui), and the 
related juancun regulations classified the Women’s Working Team as a 
ring of the juancun self-organising association (㠚⋫ᴳ, zizhihui) (Kuo 
2005: 46). 
The Women’s Working Team also established sewing factories 
and workshops in which employment skills training was provided for 
women; they could learn about domestic economy and child educa-
tion, as well as knitting, tailoring, nursing, driving, and handicraft 
(Kuo 2005: 46–48). In large-scale villages the League also helped by 
distributing welfare resources intended for the villages, such as mei-
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yuan, which was overseen by the MND (Lo 2011: 194). Residents told 
me that flour, oil, and rice rations were distributed every month in the 
village through a ration booklet (㼌㎖䅹, bujizheng). The portion of the 
subsidy was determined by the age of the receiver: a small portion (ሿ
ਓ, xiaokou) was given to children and a larger one (medium, ѝਓ, 
zhongkou, and large, བྷਓ, dakou) to adults. 
In small-scale villages the distribution of resources was carried 
out by the zizhihui, which was devised for the first time in an article of 
the military order titled “Nationalist Army’s Ways of Settlement in 
Taiwan” – promulgated by the MND in 1956 (Kuo 2005: 40–41). 
The zizhihui was led by the head of the association (㠚⋫ᴳ䮧, zizhi-
huizhang), who in the villages was often simply referred to as “chief of 
the village” (ᶁ䮧, cunzhang) (Lo 2011: 194). The self-organising asso-
ciation had a social but also a political function. On the one hand, it 
assisted the villagers with the supply of goods, applications for relief 
resources, and managing the common facilities. On the other, the 
association mobilised people during local elections by coordinating 
their votes (Lo 2011: 194) and implemented government decrees at 
the grassroots level (Kuo 2005: 44). The association was an adminis-
trative system controlled by the General Political Department (㑭᭯
⋫䜘, zong zhengzhibu) (Lo 2011: 194). According to the regulations 
provided by the MND, the chief was elected by the village residents. 
However, Mr. He stated that the process was far from democratic; 
rather, the chief was appointed in a top-down fashion: 
The chief of the village was not really elected democratically. Dem-
ocracy did not exist in the village. The chief was appointed from 
above by the party. Whoever was appointed was accepted as the 
chief. He was responsible more or less for all the opinions on 
public affairs and speeches (ᡰᴹⲴ䀰䄆, suoyou de yanlun). He was 
responsible for the governmental policies, and also for the support 
of KMT candidates during the local elections. He carried on the 
work of the KMT, the government, and the military (᧘अ഻≁唘
䐏᭯ᓌ䐏䓽䲺Ⲵһ⢙ , tuidong guomindang gen zhengfu gen jundui de 
shiwu). He also was responsible for recruiting new party members  
(੨᭦唘଑, xishou dangyuan). (Mr. He 2016)
Despite not being formally employed and not receiving a salary, the 
chief disposed of a budget to be used for village necessities – such as 
the repair of common facilities (Lo 2011: 194). The chief was helped 
in his duties by committee members (ငઈ, weiyuan), who were direct-
  146 Elisa Tamburo 

ly nominated by him. Because of receiving welfare, the village resi-
dents developed a relationship of dependence on the party-state. This 
has been characterised by Chang (2015: 96), as noted earlier, through 
the concept of exchange or jiaohuan. Welfare and resources were 
granted in exchange for political devotion (᭯⋫ᘐ䃐, zhengzhi zhong-
cheng). Similarly, Lo (2011) defined this relationship as a “symbiotic” 
one – arguing that the high degree of consistency and loyalty demon-
strated towards the KMT during its political activities is the most reli-
able indicator of such a relationship. “Through the Women’s League 
Working Team and the self-governing association, the residents con-
formed to the interests of the circle of power” (Lo 2011: 195).  
As we will see, these welfare measures not only aimed at reliev-
ing hardship but also at creating the conditions for legitimising 
Chiang’s government in Taiwan by winning the support of the mili-
tary and their families and thereby reducing the risks of coup, deser-
tion, and dissent. However, consent is not the only dimension im-
plemented by these institutions. Through the Women’s League and 
the self-organising association, the residents were also subjected to 
executive orders, propaganda, and party activities – which correspond 
to the level of coercion. According to Gramsci, exercising hegemony 
is achieved both by consensual and coercive elements: 
The “normal” exercise of hegemony […] is characterized by the 
combination of force and consent, which balance each other re-
ciprocally without force predominating excessively over consent. 
(Gramsci 1971: 80)  
Looking at these techniques of coercion through the lens of Fou-
cauldian discipline will help us to understand how mechanisms of 
such coercion were activated particularly when the hegemony of the 
KMT encountered dissent. As mentioned above, I argue that the 
moral spirit of patriotism can be studied as discipline – which result-
ed from the political and party work of the KMT. But before we turn 
to examine these forms of discipline in detail, it is necessary to ex-
plain why exerting discipline on the KMT military was even neces-
sary.  
The systematic construction of large-scale military villages fos-
tered by the Women’s League was promoted during the years of im-
portant institutional changes occurring, in particular with the reform 
of the KMT. By moving the nationalist government to Taiwan, 
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Chiang Kai-shek had to confront multiple internal and external chal-
lenges.  
Between 1945 and 1950, he concentrated on resolving the rivalry 
of fellow elites, warlords, and military commanders both on the main-
land and in Taiwan (Greitens 2013). During the years of 1950–1955, 
however, the attention of the KMT turned instead from the threat of 
nationalist elites to internal military ones – as well as the danger of 
popular uprising.  
On the one hand, the communist forces on the mainland and the 
risk of their penetration of Taiwan constituted the most significant 
external threat. Communist spies in particular infiltrated the party and 
the army leadership (Eastman 1984). On the other, there was a high 
risk of military coups and desertions. In both cases, in the 1950s, 
Chiang Kai-shek was not only concerned with a possible uprising 
within the group of the mainlanders – who seemed more likely to fall 
prey to communist penetration – but also the breaking out of military 
coups and revolts within the army (Greitens 2013: 92). Only by the 
period unfolding between the 1960s to the 1970s did the KMT even-
tually turn instead against the independent movement among the 
Taiwanese (Greitens 2013: 126–131). According to the data provided 
by Greitens:  
One-third of the total victims of state violence during the martial 
law era appear to have been mainlanders, who made up only 15 
per cent of the population. Moreover, in the early years of the 
KMT rule on Taiwan, mainlanders were more likely to be arrested, 
and if they were arrested, could expect to receive harsher sentences. 
(Greitens 2013: 71)  
The military threat was also derived from the fact that soldiers, many 
of whom were young and unmarried, had fought a tiresome war and 
were now isolated – exiled in Taiwan without any family support (Fan 
2011: 44; Yang 2012: 180). Chiang Kai-shek needed human resources 
to realise his plan of taking back the mainland, and he had to prevent 
a loss of control over the military – and thus military unrest. Political 
warfare aimed at a utilitarian maximisation of military forces, whom 
the KMT needed to discipline and control. In Foucault’s words, one 
could say that  
discipline is the unitary technique by which the body is reduced as 
a ‘political’ force at the least cost and maximized as a useful force. 
(Foucault 1995: 221)  
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For these reasons, the KMT moved from a state-centred, violent form 
of authoritarianism between 1945 and 1950 to a less violent but more 
diffuse form of control and surveillance in the years from 1950 to 
1955. The reform of the KMT, which was undertaken from 1950 to 
1952, resulted in a revival of its Leninist structure. (Dickson 1993: 56) 
First, this meant reinforcing Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership over 
the military and other governmental organs through the reconstitu-
tion of the Political Commissar System (᭯⋫င଑ࡦᓖ, zhengzhi wei-
yuan zhidu, PCS) in 1950 (Cheng 1990: 24; Eastman 1984: 210). The 
creation of a PCS within the “party-state regime” (Dickson 1993) – 
or “quasi Leninism” (Cheng 1990) – allowed the institutional organs 
of control to also be included in surveillance. This suggests that the 
target of this control was directed inwardly towards the KMT appa-
ratus itself. It was also in 1950 that Chiang Ching-kuo became the 
head of the General Political Warfare Department (GPWD) within 
the armed forces. Chiang Ching-kuo reshuffled military units and 
removed potential threats among military personnel (Greitens 2013: 
108). Not only did the constitution of the PCS avoid competition 
between similar, rival governmental organs while guaranteeing also 
their control (Greitens 2013: 107–108), but it additionally reasserted 
the principle of the “Party leads the military” in the restructuring of 
the military–party relationship (Cheng 1990: 25).  
One of the goals of the PCS was to “ensure the political loyalty 
of the military, particularly its commanders, to the civilian party” 
(Cheng 1990: 37). A key function of the PCS was to exercise the so-
called political work and party work. “Political work” (᭯⋫ᐕ֌ , 
zhengzhi gongzuo) mainly comprised military work, which was conduct-
ed by the cadres of the Political Work Department for the official 
purpose of promoting military effectiveness by “handling human 
affairs concerning the military” (Cheng 1990: 38).  
On the other hand,  
the real political functions that the PCS performs are embodied in 
party work, in which party control or governmental control over 
the military was a part. (Cheng 1990: 38) 
'LVFLSOLQH
The military plays an important role in Foucault’s study of the institu-
tionalisation of discipline. In his work Discipline and Punish, the army is – 
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together with the education system, the medical institute, and the 
penitentiary – a “site” of disciplinary power (Foucault 1995: 143). 
From the military barracks to the training camp, the army is the place 
that makes possible the disciplining of “docile bodies” – which he 
defines as bodies that “may be subjected, used, transformed and im-
proved” (Foucault 1995: 136). He defines disciplines as  
the methods, which made possible the meticulous control of the 
operations of the body, which assured the constant subjection of 
its forces and imposed upon them a relation of docility-utility. 
(Foucault 1995: 137)  
Although Foucault analyses these institutionalised sites of discipline 
at length, he insists that discipline is not an institution. Foucault fur-
ther defines discipline as “a type of power, a modality for its exercise, 
comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels 
of application, targets […]” (Foucault 1995: 215). Discipline is also 
“the effects of power to the most minute and distant elements” (Fou-
cault 1995: 216). 
Foucault, however, talks about elements that make discipline 
possible, principles that operationalise it. First, he talks about distri-
bution in space: “Discipline sometimes requires enclosure” (Foucault 
1995: 141). From the military barracks to the factory or the monastic 
cell, discipline organises an analytical space – according to the prin-
ciple of partition. “Disciplinary space tends to be divided into as 
many sections as there are bodies or elements to be distributed” 
(Foucault 1995: 143). The aim of segmentation is to make bodies 
localisable. Second, he puts forward the principle of hierarchical ob-
servation as a means of correct training. The technique of observa-
tion  
makes it possible to see induce effects of power, and which, con-
versely, the means of coercion make those on whom they are ap-
plied clearly visible. (Foucault 1995: 171)  
Distribution in space and hierarchical observation are the key prin-
ciples of Bentham’s Panopticon:  
This enclosed, segmented space, observed at every point, in which 
the individuals are inserted in a fixed place, in which the slightest 
movements are supervised, in which all the events are recorded, 
[…] in which, the individual is constantly located, examined and 
distributed among the living beings, the sick and the dead – all this 
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constitutes a compact model of the disciplinary mechanism. (Fou-
cault 1995: 197) 
Yet Foucault clearly sees Bentham’s Panopticon as something more 
than an ideal architectonic form, as a panoptic schema may be used 
whenever a particular form of behaviour must be imposed:  
But the Panopticon must not be understood as a dream building: 
it is the diagram of the mechanism of power reduced to its ideal 
form; its functioning, abstracted from any obstacle, resistance or 
friction, must be represented as a pure architectural and optical 
system: it is in fact a figure of political technology that may and 
must be detached from any specific use. (Foucault 1995: 205)  
A third and final dimension of disciplining is the “normalisation of 
judgement,” which I will refer to henceforth as “a morality regime.” 
Foucault explains that a “small penal mechanism” (1995: 177) is cru-
cial for every disciplinary regime. Normalising judgement, like a mi-
cro-penalty system – a small-scale court – consists of specific ways of 
punishing: 
The workshop, the school, the army were subjected to a whole 
micro-penalty of time (lateness, absences, interruptions of tasks), 
of activity (inattention, negligence, lack of zeal), of behaviour (im-
politeness, disobedience), of speech (idle chatter, insolence), of the 
body (“incorrect” attitudes, irregular gestures, lack of cleanliness), 
of sexuality (impurity, indecency). (Foucault 1995: 178) 
A more subtle way of disciplining, this morality regime is often an 
“artificial order” derived from laws, regulations, or a particular pro-
gramme. As we will see later, a specific moral order was enforced by 
KMT authoritarianism in the villages where military personnel resid-
ed; non-conformity to this order was punishable to various degrees. 
'LVFLSOLQLQJ%RGLHV6HQVHVDQG0RUDOLW\
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In the village there were a lot of “deep throats” (␡ஹ೘, shen-
houlong), informants (੺ᇶᆀ , gaomizi). They were voluntary in-
formants (㠚ᝯⲴ੺ᇶᆀ, ziyuan de gaomizi), who reported to the 
authorities in their own interests. Many indeed became informants 
voluntarily. […] My parents’ thought was not really right (⿅゛ᶵ
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ཚሩ, sixiang butai dui), but they limited it to avoiding attending the 
[political] activities; they did their thing, and the others did their 
own. Perhaps, my parents believed that the KMT did too many 
extreme things (ᖸ䙾࠶Ⲵһᛵ, hen guofen de shiqing); maybe it was 
the political environment (᭯⋫Ⲵ⫠ຳ, zhengzhi de huanjing). How-
ever, in the village they did not dare to talk (нᮒ䅋, bugan jiang) and 
even they could not talk (ҏн㜭䅋, ye buneng jiang) because you did not 
know who was a spy (liaobei). Liaobei is the Taiwanese for spy (䯃䄌, 
jiandie). If there were three people mentioning informants, they 
would use the Taiwanese term – so that he would not know im-
mediately what they were talking about. (Mr. He 2016) 
Establishing networks of informants was not exclusive to juancun, but 
rather they permeated Taiwan’s society in a capillary manner begin-
ning in the 1950s. This network of informants finds its origins in the 
baojia system (Japanese: ؍⭢, hoko), the community-based security 
apparatus that the KMT inherited in 1945 from the Japanese and that 
was initially discarded by the nationalist government in favour of 
more coercive institutions that originated on the mainland. The Japa-
nese police system  
was a centralized, internally coordinated, inclusive, and socially 
penetrative internal security apparatus that relied on the baojia sys-
tem of communal responsibility to create strong local networks of 
monitoring and surveillance. (Greitens 2013: 72).  
The Japanese divided Taiwan’s neighbourhoods into groups of 
households (Japanese: ho), where each ho assisted the police with du-
ties such as monitoring the population’s movements. “It was a system 
of collective responsibility and punishment, of internal social control 
as well as external self-defence” (Greitens 2013: 78). 
An example of such penetration of surveillance is given by Ho’s 
research (2010) on state-owned enterprises during the authoritarian 
era. For instance, Ho describes the capillary network of informants 
that permeated the sugar refinery factories during the 1950s and the 
1960s. This was constituted by KMT party members, which “silenced 
rank-and-file workers” (Ho 2010: 563), but even more so by the spe-
cial agents trained by the Bureau of Investigation who were placed in 
every plant. According to Ho:  
They were responsible for monitoring the day-to-day behaviour of 
workers. […] To facilitate their broad-ranging tasks of super-
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vision, they built a clandestine network of informants among the 
workforce. (Ho 2010: 567) 
However, unlike these externally imposed control mechanisms, sur-
veillance within the military was internally grown and institutional-
ised. Despite initially disregarding the baojia system, the KMT eventu-
ally revived it in 1950 when Chiang Ching-kuo converted the KMT’s 
fragmented policing apparatus into a unified system of monitoring 
and control (Greitens 2013: 98). With the reform of the KMT, politi-
cal work was introduced. Party work included organisational work (㍴
㒄ᐕ֌, zuzhi gongzuo) and the surveillance of troops. Zuzhi gongzuo 
included “the establishment and development of a party structure in 
the military, recruitment, training, evaluation, and personnel control 
of the party members” (Cheng 1990: 39). With party work slated, 
political and bureaucratic surveillance was also institutionalised: “Pol-
itical surveillance aims at securing military officers’ loyalty to the Party 
and at preventing desertion among the rank and file” (Cheng 1990: 
39). It also strived to prevent corruption, poor morale, and inefficien-
cy within the military bureaucracy (Cheng 1990: 39).  
Similarly, within the juancun the system of surveillance and re-
porting was internally legitimised and institutionalised through the 
self-organising association – which was controlled by the General 
Political Department. Mr. Zhang, who was at the time of my field-
work a second-generation waishengren acting as chief of the village 
where I lived, told me about his father’s personality and duties as a 
political instructor (ᤷሾ଑, zhidaoyuan) and as himself chief of the 
village carrying out political work: 
My father was a political instructor. Generally, political instructors 
were all … because they were responsible for control. It resembles 
the police within the army, they have to grab the bad elements: it 
is a bit like a teacher, they have to examine you, instruct you. So, a 
lot of people within the army disliked these kind of people, but 
my father would argue with their superiors for the sake of his 
subordinates, so my father was a very serious person. (Mr. Zhang 
2016)  
The chief of the village was, in fact, not only responsible for the im-
plementation of the government decrees (Kuo 2005: 44) and political 
work; he was also required to submit reports to the “relevant authori-
ties” (Kuo 2005: 43). 
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Every month the president of the zizhihui should contact the re-
spective authorities to report the current state of village super-
vision; in case there were incidents affecting security (ᆹޘ, an-
quan), or regulation were broken, he should immediately submit a 
report to the relevant authorities or to the local statute or police to 
solve it. (Kuo 2005: 43)  
6HOI&HQVRUVKLSDQGWKH'LVFLSOLQLQJRIWKH6HQVHV
“You did not know who was a spy” said Mr. He, describing the power 
of the panoptic principle. One of the effects of panoptic discipline is 
self-censorship. The presence of a vast network of informants affect-
ed disciplinary behaviour. According to Mr. He, the majority of the 
informants would report directly to the party office, while the party 
would communicate with the Ministry of National Defence – which 
would then pass the information on to the Military Intelligence Bur-
eau (䓽һᛵ๡ተ, junshi qingbaoju). “Not being satisfied with the gov-
ernment and enunciating this dissatisfaction would be sufficient for 
you to encounter problems” (Mr. He 2016). Upon receiving tip-offs, 
the security officers would then move to catch those individuals: “If 
you talked, your voice could reach the ears of the intelligence agency” 
(Mr. He 2016). Mr. Wang, a second-generation waishengren active in 
juancun preservation in southern Taiwan, expressed similar thoughts: 
Actually, within the juancun there were many people who could not 
know the state, could not understand the state, and could not 
make allowance for it. These [inhabitants] required people check-
ing on their conversations, or similar institutions. In addition, the 
state was also conveniently using “comprehensive lecturing” (ᮤ億
䁃䂡, zhengti xunhua); that is, when the state had to carry orders in 
a juancun and guide people it had to do it through a person – that 
person was the window of the state. (Mr. Wang 2015) 
Once a person was heard, the one who had originally detected the 
dissent would report to the relative unit that the individual in ques-
tion thought in a certain way; he would “rat on a colleague,” Mr. 
Wang commented.  
So when we were young there was a saying: “Pay attention, 
Communist spies are right next to you” (ሿᗳग़䄌൘֐䓛䚺, xiaoxin, 
feidie zai nishenbian). That spy was one of us (Mr. Wang 2015). 
As a consequence of this close control, discipline created “ta-
boo” topics that needed to be avoided in the villages. 
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There were many things that one could not say. For instance, one 
could not say that there was not hope to take back the mainland  
(৽᭫བྷ䲨⋂ᴹᐼᵋ , fangong dalu meiyou xiwang). One could not 
manifest appreciation for the Communist Party (нਟԕ䃚ޡ⭒唘
ᴹཊྭ, bu keyi shuo gongchandang you duohao). One also could not 
collect the Communist propaganda leaflets that were dropped 
from the sky by the communists’ planes. One could not criticise 
Chiang Kai-shek (нਟԕᢩ䂅㪻ӻ⸣, bu keyi piping Jiang Jieshi). You 
could not think of getting rid of the KMT (֐нਟԕᜣᡁ㾱ഭ≁ފ
ᒩᦹ, ni bukeyi xiang wo yao Guomindang gandiao). (Mr. He 2016) 
In the context of military villages’ relocation projects, Mr. Wang also 
told me that this self-disciplining of speech was continuing in the 
present too. Elderly residents often kept quiet when faced with evic-
tion, as their past education had exhorted them never to speak up. He 
told me: 
They don’t know whom they could talk to about their innermost 
feelings, because they were military personnel, and how was the 
military? They proclaimed they had to pledge loyalty to the state. 
When they [soldiers] became old, they realised that despite having 
pledged loyalty to the state, they unexpectedly are hurt by the 
same state and they are distressed, but they cannot talk. The edu-
cation they received is not the same I received, the education of 
that time taught that these things cannot be said. (Mr. Wang 2015) 
Yet, the disciplining of speech was not the only way to control behav-
iour. Bodily senses such as seeing and watching were subjected to 
discipline for instance on Jinmen Island, where soldiers were forbid-
den to use binoculars to gaze at the mainland. Hearing and listening 
were also subjected to discipline. The violation of the ban on listening 
to People’s Republic of China radio could, for instance, be easily 
identified and reported, due to the military villages’ thin, badly insu-
lated walls made of bamboo and mud (⌕ᐤ, niba). My conversations 
with veterans revealed that smell and taste were the senses that en-
joyed more freedom, whereas seeing, hearing, and speaking were 
disciplined. Soldiers often found consolation from being completely 
cut off from mainland China only in the dishes of their homeland (ᇦ
䜹㨌, jiaxiang cai) – which later became known as juancun cuisine, or 
juancun cai (ⵧᶁ㨌). 
Here, the juancun space plays a peculiar role in disciplining the 
body and the senses. Village residents would regulate their listening 
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according to the situation, as they could easily know what was hap-
pening next door. Residents were also careful about what was said in 
their everyday life and family situations, as information spread easily 
in the villages in the form of gossip – being facilitated by the material-
ity of the cramped houses built next to each other. This was particu-
larly so in the villages built by the Women’s League in the mid-1950s, 
where the spatial distribution of them was similar to the typical “fish 
bone” (劬僘, yugu) style of military barracks. For this reason, these 
villages were also known as “villages in serial” (㚟अⵧᶁ, liandong 
juancun) (Chang 2015: 46). In the military villages, the power of discip-
line lay in its fragmentation:  
Power has its principle not so much in a person as in a certain 
concerted distribution of bodies, surfaces, lights, gazes; in an ar-
rangement whose internal mechanism produce the relation in 
which individuals are caught up. (Foucault 1995: 202) 
Hence, if in the villages “the gaze was everywhere,” residents usually 
exercised discipline “spontaneously and without noise” (Foucault 
1995: 206). This “distribution of bodies” facilitated the proliferation 
of power through the embodiment of a specific moral order, a moral-
ity regime. 
0RUDOLW\5HJLPHV
Even though Mr. He regarded his parents as non-conformists, he 
described them – as with the majority of the mainlanders of the first 
generation – as “obedient people” (ᖸ㚭䂡ⲴӪ, hen tinghua de ren). 
Similarly, Mr. Wang talks about a “moral frame” (䚃ᗧṶᷦ, daode 
kuangjia) of reference that the military personnel were constantly re-
ferring to when choosing silence over speaking up: 
They thought that speaking their mind would violate their moral 
standards. […] The incapacity of voicing is still mainly an issue of 
“moral feeling” (䚃ᗧᝏ, daodegan), that is that I am a soldier and I 
have to proclaim it openly, I have to pledge loyalty to the state. I 
cannot talk badly about the state, if I do it is like betraying the 
state. (Mr. Wang 2015)  
For Foucault, obedience and morality are facilitated by subtler discip-
linary techniques, a morality regime: 
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In appearance, the disciplines constitute nothing more than an in-
fra-law. They seem to extend the general forms defined by law to 
the infinitesimal level of individual lives; or they appear as methods 
of training that enable individuals to become integrated into these 
general demands. (Foucault 1995: 222) 
Ms. Liu is a Hakka woman – a Han Chinese group also present in 
Taiwan, whose ancestral homes are located in the main Hakka-speak-
ing regions of southern China – and she is originally from Taidong 
area. She told me many stories about the “infra-law” and the morality 
regimes that discipline produced. She had been married to a waisheng-
ren and had in the past lived in several juancun (now all demolished). 
Ms. Liu then divorced her husband after several years of experiencing 
domestic violence, and therefore had, expectedly, distressing memo-
ries of living in a military village. 
When Chiang Kai-shek died, every morning and every evening one 
had to go to a room that had been arranged for the occasion, a 
room that was similar to the “activity centre” (⍫अѝᗳ, huodong 
zhongxin). Every village resident had to go there to burn incense (✗
俉, shaoxiang) and worship (ᤌᤌ, baibai). There were some people 
who argued that Chiang Kai-shek was a Christian, so they ques-
tioned the necessity of burning incense. They were told that going 
there and performing Christian prayer (⿡੺, daogao) was also ok. 
Then, we all went. At that time the TV was in black and white, be-
fore eating we had to sing the national anthem following the TV 
and only afterwards could we start eating. The whole juancun was 
doing this, not just our household. (Ms. Liu 2016) 
The creation of a morality regime in the military villages was the re-
sult of the so-called political work, which included education, hand-
ling of human relations, soldiers’ welfare, and political warfare. Edu-
cation essentially meant ideological-political indoctrination. Political 
education was conducted through instillation of party ideology and 
morality as well as via spiritual and moral mobilisation. This type of 
education has also being called “propaganda of integration” (Ellul 
1965: 74, cited by Cheng 1990: 40) or “political socialization” (Jones 
1985: 114, cited by Cheng 1990: 40). The program of political sociali-
sation envisioned by the political work made juancun a patriotic and 
moralistic environment through indoctrination, education, and propa-
ganda (Bullard 1997: 70). These activities emphasised the value of 
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physical labour and making a living, the value of patriotism, loyalty, 
personal sacrifice, and social service (Bullard 1997: 67). 
As political work was part of a broader mission of political war-
fare – which aimed at the improvement of the effectiveness of the 
troops – it transcended political socialisation. In particular attention 
was dedicated to structuring and regulating the military’s leisure time, 
what Bullard calls “morale-enhancing activities” (1997: 69–71). These 
activities aimed first at ensuring high troop morale within the army; 
only later did political work focus on the indoctrination of the troops 
with patriotic messages and the development of “investigative tech-
niques to identify individuals who were not accepting that message” 
(Bullard 1997: 71) – such as potential dissidents and non-conformists. 
Finally, attention would be focused on developing techniques of iso-
lating and removing these dissidents (Bullard 1997: 71). Mr. Zhang 
elaborated on the responsibilities of his father as a political instructor 
carrying out political work in the village, and the related working unit: 
Ideology, recreation, the scope of political work is huge. Of 
course there are organisational aspects: ideological, security, keep-
ing secrets and preventing espionage, control, recreational activi-
ties. All these aspects are handled by political work. My father 
worked in the psychiatry department of the hospital. Beyond pol-
itical work, in the department they also had recreational activities 
and physical exercise; these activities were all responsibility of the 
political instructor. (Mr. Zhang 2016) 
Morale-enhancing activities found their best expressions in entertain-
ment, which occasionally entered the everyday life of military villages. 
Film and opera in particular were an integral part of juancun life. In 
the 1950s the Women’s League created the “Movie Team” (䴫ᖡ䱏, 
dianyingdui), whose most important entertainment activity (။′⍫अ, 
yule huodong) was the screening of movies (Kuo 2005: 48). It was one 
of the duties of the Women’s League and of the chief of the village to 
maintain a “happy and peaceful” atmosphere in the juancun (Kuo 
2005: 42).  
Despite these occasional entertainment activities, patriotic moral-
ity regimes came on top of the everyday moralising environment – 
where residents’ behaviours and whereabouts were often at the centre 
of village interests. Ms. Liu described gossip as an insulting, envious, 
and pointless invention that one experienced as a daily public trial (ޜ
ሙ, gongshen). 
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Let’s say that I live in that house, the house of my husband’s 
brothers. I had to wash the blanket every week, however at that 
time there was no washing machine. At that time, I was pregnant 
of many months, and washing the blanket by hand was not easy, 
so I asked a mainlander lady if she could wash it for me. She did, 
but afterwards she would go around the village saying that I was 
not washing anything, and that she was doing all the laundry for 
me, which was not at all true. I suffered so much. If I think about 
it now, this gossip did not mean anything. […] They also would 
tell me things about other residents: “Meimei, come here. That lady 
yesterday came back home with a boyfriend, her husband did not 
come back home, but she came back with a boyfriend.” (Ms. Liu 
2016) 
Ms. Liu attributed this judgemental environment to the lack of space, 
friends, money, and distraction. The residents were living very close 
to each another, and in the village people did not have many friends. 
As money was scarce, options for entertainment and recreation were 
limited and there was no way of going out for fun or meeting friends. 
People did not have an occupation to get distracted by. Mr. He re-
called similar memories of the villages where he lived.  
People in the village would judge and reproach (ࡔᯧ઼ᢩ䂅, pan-
duan he piping) many things, even the smallest issue. For instance, 
my mom would go to do the groceries and once she came back 
someone would reproach her that she spent too much money. But 
there were also national issues that were motives of reproach: 
“You can’t say this! I really need to tell you, you can’t say this!” (֐
нਟԕ䙉⁓䅋 ᡁᖸᗚൠ֐нਟԕ䙉⁓䅋, ni bu keyi zheyang jiang, 
wo hen xunde ni bu keyi zheyang jiang). If someone spoke to you in 
this way, it meant that you were alone with this person and that no 
one else was there. (Mr. He 2016) 
In other instances, the judgement aimed at provoking an action. Mr. 
He remembered that senior village residents would warmly invite him 
to go and vote if he had not done so, yet:  
They would ask you, “Did you vote?” They could know if I had 
told the truth because at that time if you had voted, you also 
would have received a stamp on your ID card. (Mr. He 2016)  
Foucault explains how disciplinary techniques are seen as “the hum-
ble, but concrete form of every morality, whereas they are a set of 
psycho-political techniques” (Foucault 1995: 223). The effectiveness 
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of morality regimes did not necessarily rely on written rules. The 
death of Chiang Kai-shek was not only accompanied by incense 
burning and worshipping, but also by verbal rules of conduct. Ms. 
Liu told me a story: 
I have a joke about the time when Chiang Kai-shek died. After his 
death, an unwritten rule was established in the village: every couple 
was forbidden to have sex for a month starting from the day of 
Chiang Kai-shek’s death. When we heard about this rule we 
thought it was a joke, but it was not; so we all agreed and said, ok, 
we will do that. After New Year’s, it was May, a baby was born in 
the village. As soon as people made their calculations, it was clear 
that the baby had been conceived during the sex-ban period. As a 
result, people would stare at the mother of the baby, and nobody 
could talk to her as she violated the rule (ᢃ⹤䛓ػ㾿ᇊ, dapo nage 
guiding) and she failed to respect the president (ሽ㑭㎡нᮜ, dui 
zongtong bu jing). (Ms. Liu 2016)  
&RQFOXVLRQ
In this article, I have investigated the ways in which KMT authoritari-
anism permeated the everyday life of the residents of military villages, 
the juancun, in Taiwan. This research angle has allowed me to explore 
the micro-level mechanisms of coercion that the KMT deployed to 
remain in power and secure support among its own people. These 
mechanisms were in effect particularly during the 1950s, when the 
military threat from China was severe, the hunt for Communist spies 
reached its peak, and an internal military coup was strongly feared.  
I have argued that while welfare measures were effective in creat-
ing consent, the KMT’s hegemonic power could not have been im-
plemented without coercive mechanisms too – at which I looked 
through the lens of Foucauldian discipline. Surveillance, the disciplin-
ing of the body and the senses, and the creation of morality regimes 
were all disciplinary mechanisms in action to individualise, silence, or 
exclude the pathological. 
The deployment of informants and the institutionalisation of a 
reporting system within the villages resulted in self-censorship and 
the disciplining of the senses. The place of the juancun facilitates daily 
sensory censorship within residents, while morality regimes created 
unwritten rules that were used as “psycho-political techniques.” All 
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these disciplinary mechanisms were complicit in creating a panoptic 
environment and co-optation into the KMT regime. 
In recent years, military villages have increasingly become the 
setting of TV dramas, theatre performances, and literary productions, 
wherein they are depicted as familial, romantic places in which resi-
dents dwell harmoniously, youth stories unfold, and the culinary tra-
ditions from mainland China are passed on. As Huang (2014: 152) 
noticed, these productions have turned the tragic experience of war, 
exile, and political control into a comic, sentimental past. While irony 
and laughter are powerful weapons to deal with a difficult national 
past, it is the task of the social sciences to engage with the darker 
aspects of Taiwan’s authoritarian history. In this article I have shed 
light, then, on how authoritarianism permeated the everyday life of 
waishengren living in military dependents’ villages. While their experi-
ences are often unquestionably and solely associated with consent to 
the upper echelons of KMT authoritarianism, here I have shown the 
hidden, internally grown mechanisms of power and control that in-
stead governed their everyday life.  
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